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THE NEW GATEKEEPERS:
PRIVATE FIRMS AS PUBLIC ENFORCERS
Rory Van Loo*
The world’s largest businesses must routinely police other businesses. By public
mandate, Facebook monitors app developers’ privacy safeguards, Citibank
audits call centers for deceptive sales practices, and Exxon reviews offshore oil
platforms’ environmental standards. Scholars have devoted significant attention
to how policy makers deploy other private sector enforcers, such as certification
bodies, accountants, lawyers, and other periphery “gatekeepers.” However, the
literature has yet to explore the emerging regulatory conscription of large firms
at the center of the economy. This Article examines the rise of the enforcer-firm
through case studies of the industries that are home to the most valuable
companies, in technology, banking, oil, and pharmaceuticals. Over the past two
decades, administrative agencies have used legal rules, guidance documents,
and court orders to mandate that private firms in these and other industries
perform the duties of a public regulator. More specifically, firms must write
rules in their contracts that reserve the right to inspect third parties. When they
find violations, they must pressure or punish the wrongdoer. This form of
governance has important intellectual and policy implications. It imposes more
of a public duty on the firm, alters corporate governance, and may even reshape
business organizations. It also gives resource-strapped regulators promising
tools. If designed poorly, however, the enforcer-firm will create an expansive
area of unaccountable authority. Any comprehensive account of the firm or
regulation must give a prominent role to the administrative state’s newest
gatekeepers.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2018, Facebook Chairman and CEO Mark Zuckerberg faced senators on
national television regarding conduct that prompted the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) to seek its largest ever fine.1 The main issue was not what
Facebook did directly to its users. Instead, the hearing focused on the social
network’s failure to restrain third parties. Most notably, the political consulting
firm Cambridge Analytica accessed millions of users’ accounts in an effort to
support election candidates.2 Before Zuckerberg’s Senate testimony, the FTC
had already sued Google and Amazon to force them to monitor third parties for
privacy violations and in-app video game purchases by children that sometimes
reached in the thousands of dollars.3 In other words, the FTC is requiring large
1
Cecilia Kang, A Facebook Settlement With the F.T.C. Could Run Into the Billions, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 15, 2019, at B6.
2
Katy Steinmetz, Mark Zuckerberg Survived Congress. Now Facebook Has to Survive the
FTC, Time (Apr. 13, 2018, 12:42 PM) https://time.com/5237900/facebook-ftc-privacy-datacambridge-analytica/.
3
See F.T.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C14-1038-JCC, 2016 WL 10654030, at *8 (W.D.
Wash. July 22, 2016) (finding Amazon accountable for in-app charges); Agreement Containing
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technology companies to act in ways traditionally associated with public
regulators—by policing other businesses for legal violations.
Over time policy makers have enlisted a large array of private actors in their
quest for optimal regulatory design.4 Scholarship on the private role in public
governance has focused on third-party enforcers whose main function is to
provide a support service. Those enforcers include self-regulatory organizations
formed by industry and independent auditors mandated by regulators.5 The
corporate law strand of this enforcement literature emphasizes a network of
“gatekeepers,” such as lawyers, accountants, and certifiers who guard against
compliance and governance failures.6 For instance, before releasing annual
reports a publicly traded company must obtain the signoff of a certified
accountant.7 In these more familiar private enforcement contexts, the private

Consent Order at 5, In the Matter of Google Inc. No. 102-3136, (F.T.C. March 30, 2011),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/03/110330googlebuzzagreeorder.
pdf (ordering Google to require “service providers by contract to implement and maintain
appropriate privacy protections.”).
4
See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation As Delegation: Private Firms,
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 Duke L.J. 377, 453 (2006)
(conceiving of regulators’ decisions to let regulated entities fill in vague mandates as delegation);
Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 691 (2003) (describing the
“intertwining of the public and private sectors”); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 549–56 (2000) (surveying the great diversity of private
governance actors); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1367,
1369 (2003) (conceiving of privatization of health care, welfare provision, prisons, and public
education as delegation); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the
New Religion, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1229, 1237–42 (2003) (exploring implications of privatization
for public values).
5
Bamberger, supra note 4, at 452–58; Freeman, supra note 4, at 635, 644. As another
example, in policing stock exchanges, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) relies
heavily on self-regulatory organizations to monitor wrongdoing and propose rules. Jennifer M.
Pacella, If the Shoe of the SEC Doesn’t Fit: Self-Regulatory Organizations and Absolute
Immunity, 58 Wayne L. Rev. 201, 202 (2012) . Courts also order third-party monitors. See
Veronica Root, The Monitor-“Client” Relationship, 100 Va. L. Rev. 523, 531–33 (2014).
6
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (2006)
(chronicling the evolution of auditors, attorneys, securities analysts, and credit-rating agencies
in guarding against corporate governance failures); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 53, 107 (2003) (discussing the need to expand gatekeeper liability in the wake of
the Enron fraud scandal); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 53, 54 (1986) (contrasting whistleblowers with
gatekeepers, which are third parties who can “prevent misconduct by withholding support.”).
7
15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2018) (“Every issuer of a security . . . shall file with the
Commission . . . such annual reports (and such copies thereof), certified if required by the rules
and regulations of the Commission by independent public accountants . . . .”).
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“cops on the beat”8 are ancillary actors rather than core market participants.9
This Article demonstrates how policymakers have enlisted a new class of
more powerful third-party enforcers: the businesses at the heart of the economy.
The ten largest American companies by valuation operate in information
technology, finance, oil, and pharmaceuticals.10 A regulator has put leading
firms in each of these industries on notice about their responsibilities for thirdparty oversight.11 In addition to the FTC, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA)—along with the Department of Justice (DOJ)—requires BP Oil and other
energy companies to audit offshore oil platform operators for environmental
compliance.12 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) expects Pfizer and
other drug companies to ensure suppliers and third-party labs follow the
agency’s health and safety guidelines.13 The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) orders financial institutions, such as American Express, to
monitor independent debt collectors and call centers for deceptive practices.14
Kraakman, supra note 6, at 53 n.1 (attributing to Jeremy Bentham the “cop on the beat”
metaphor and using it to describe gatekeepers).
9
The literature has also extensively analyzed self-regulation as part of a broader new
governance that arose in recent decades. Administrative agencies now pursue collaborative and
responsive models of public governance designed to encourage the business sector to selfregulate. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the
Deregulation Debate (1992); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 4 (1997). Additionally, large businesses have dramatically grown
their compliance departments to police the firm from within. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Corporate
Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2075, 2077 (2016); Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
571, 572 (2005); Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 Cornell L. Rev.
1003, 1004 (2017) . This important and nascent literature on corporate compliance has remained
focused on the firm’s role in overseeing internal operations, or on traditional gatekeepers doing
so.
10
Fortune
500
List,
Fortune
(updated
Mar.
29,
2018),
http://fortune.com/fortune500/list/filtered?sortBy=mktval (identifying the ten most valuable
American companies as Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway, Facebook,
JPMorgan Chase, Johnson & Johnson, Exxon Mobile, and Bank of America). One of these
companies, Berkshire Hathaway, is a conglomerate operating in diverse industries, including
finance, while Johnson & Johnson sells pharmaceuticals in addition to consumer goods.
Berkshire
Hathaway,
Fortune
(updated
Mar.
29,
2018),
https://fortune.com/fortune500/2018/berkshire-hathaway/Johnson & Johnson, Fortune (updated
Mar. 29, 2018), https://fortune.com/fortune500/2018/johnson-johnson/.
11
See infra Part II
12
Consent Decree Among Defendant BP Exploration & Production Inc., the United States
of America, and the States of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, at 32–33, In
re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL
No. 2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 2015).
13
21 C.F.R. § 211.22(a) (2018) (explaining best practices for quality control of contractors);
Letter from FDA Office of Regulatory Affairs to Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc. (Sept. 5,
2017), https://www.fda.gov/iceci/enforcementactions/warningletters/2017/ucm574981.htm.
14
Joint Consent Order, In the Matter of Am. Express Centurion Bank, No. FDIC-12-315b,
8
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The widespread conscription of businesses as enforcers—also called
“enforcer-firms” below—shares characteristics with but differs meaningfully
from prior iterations of third-party regulation. For instance, the FTC’s original
court order required Facebook to hire a third-party auditor—an example of the
old gatekeeper model–to certify Facebook’s compliance.15 In that arrangement,
refusing to sign off on Facebook’s biennial reports to the FTC constituted the
auditor’s main sanction.16 Facebook could, however, respond to that sanction by
bringing its business elsewhere.17 That ability to retaliate weakens traditional
gatekeepers’ power and independence.18
In contrast, the enforcer-firm is usually the client—or at least a crucial
business partner—to the third parties it regulates. Its main sanction is to cease
doing business with those third parties, which can prove devastating.19 The client
relationship that weakens traditional gatekeepers thus strengthens the enforcerfirm. In short, policymakers have begun relying on third-party enforcement by
the real gatekeepers of the economy: the firms who control access to core
product markets.20
In highlighting a new enforcement model, this Article builds on the literature
scrutinizing the increasingly narrow divide between private businesses and the
administrative state.21 Although that scholarship has yet to examine the enforcerfirm in any sustained manner,22 mandated third-party governance raises similar
FDIC-12-316k,
2012-CFPB-0002
(F.D.I.C.,
C.F.P.B.
Oct.
1,
2012),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2012/pr12114a.pdf [hereinafter American Express
Consent Order]
15
Decision and Order at 3–4, In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., No. 092-3184 (F.T.C. July
27,
2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookdo.pdf.
16
See id at 6.
17
The consent order does not prevent such a response. See id.
18
See Joel S. Demski, Corporate Conflicts of Interest, 17 J. Econ. Persp. 51, 57 (2003).
19
See infra Part IV.A.
20
A diversified firm may play both a new and traditional gatekeeper role. For instance, by
allowing a company to serve as both a commercial bank and investment bank, the law enabled
large financial institutions to operate as both traditional gatekeepers—overseeing their clients
by underwriting securities, prompted by liability avoidance under the Securities Act of 1933—
and as new gatekeepers, being the clients who hire third party businesses. See infra Part II.A.;
Kraakman, supra note 6, at 83.
21
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
22
To the extent scholars have discussed mandated third-party governance it has been in
passing or in narrower contexts such as in criminal or international law. See, e.g., Larry Catá
Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 327, 433–34 (2004) (referencing how the Bank Secrecy
Act causes a larger number of businesses to become “part of the network of the state’s eyes and
ears.”)John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies, 34 World Dev.
884, 889–90 (2006) (exploring how domestic firms can serve as a means of reaching foreign
actors); Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
797, 910 (2016) (focusing on money laundering); Itai Grinberg, The Battle over Taxing Offshore
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accountability issues as previous generations of third-party enforcement. In
particular, as a new area of quasi-regulatory activity unlikely to be overturned
by judicial review, conscripted enforcement lacks transparency and traditional
measures of public involvement, such as notice and comment rulemaking.23
However, if designed well, the enforcer-firm offers some hope for improving
upon prior regulatory models’ accountability. Because enforcer-firms often sell
directly to consumers they may prove more responsive to public concerns when
compared to traditional gatekeepers, which interact most closely with regulated
entities.24 And because the enforcer-firm is itself a prime target of public
regulation, it would be easier for an administrative agency to oversee it than to
add a whole new category of firms as required for oversight of traditional
gatekeepers.25 The conscription of businesses has proved crucial in other
unwieldy administrative contexts, facilitating the transformation of the U.S.
fiscal system to reliance on a previously unadministrable income tax on
individuals.26 The enforcer-firm could, by analogy, enable the regulatory state
to bring dispersed business actors into compliance.
None of this should be taken as an endorsement of the enforcer-firm, which
is too new and understudied to yield strong normative conclusions. However, an
openness to the upsides of the enforcer-firm responds to the critique that
administrative law scholars have too often portrayed private actors as an
intrusion into legitimacy, which prevents “imagining the means by which private
actors might contribute to accountability.”27
Mandated third-party governance also speaks to vibrant corporate law
inquiries. Scholars have paid considerable attention to the duties of directors and
officers, personal liability for corporate wrongdoing, and organizational
structure.28 Conscripted enforcement shapes each of these areas and pushes
Accounts, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 304 (2012) (referencing a “growing consensus that financial
institutions should act as cross-border tax intermediaries”). For other ways that scholars have
recognized that businesses regulate other firms, see infra Part I.
23
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1129, 1130 (2016) (“Most aspects of agency enforcement policy generally escape judicial
review.”); Freeman, supra note 4, at 647 (“Most self-regulatory programs lack the transparency
and public involvement that characterize legislative rulemaking.”); Lesley K. McAllister,
Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (2012) (identifying
accountability challenges with third-party enforcement models).
24
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 6, at 13–18 (describing gatekeeper shortcomings).
25
See infra Part IV.B.
26
Ajay K. Mehrotra, Making the Modern American Fiscal State: Law, Politics, and the Rise
of Progressive Taxation, 1877-1929, 282-83 (2013).
27
Freeman, supra note 4, at 675. Numerous scholars have taken up this call in other contexts.
See, e.g., Sarah Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 137,
139–41 (2019) (calling for a holistic view of corporations’ role in promoting environmental
goals).
28
See generally Nicolai J. Foss et al., The Theory of the Firm, in Encyclopedia of Law &
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against depictions of the firm emphasizing its private nature. Those depictions
are rooted in the influential metaphor—sometimes described as the most
dominant theory of the firm—that the firm is a “nexus of contracts” among
owners, managers, laborers, suppliers, and customers.29 The firm remains
exceedingly private. But by directing businesses to write enforcement-oriented
contract clauses and monitor external relationships for legal violations, as a
descriptive matter the state is pushing the firm toward a larger public role.30
That insight is relevant beyond theory and institutional design. In the highest
legislative circles and corporate boardrooms, debates are unfolding about what
duties corporations owe to society, with some taking particular aim at the idea
that shareholders should come above all other stakeholders.31 Conscripted
enforcement marks a significant uptick in federal regulatory involvement in the
firm by imposing more of an affirmative public duty to act.32 Cast against the
backdrop of the firm as public enforcer, calls for business leaders to do more for
society appear less disconnected from reality than would be the case under a
largely private conception of the firm.33
The Article is structured as follows. Part I provides an overview of the wellstudied ways that private entities serve as enforcers. Part II offers four case
studies of how regulators have implemented mandated enforcement of third
parties in some of the largest U.S. industries: the FTC and technology, the CFPB
and banking, the EPA and oil, and the FDA and pharmaceuticals. Part III
examines how mandated enforcement alters the firm’s contracts, relationships,
and governance. It also explores shifts in liability at the personal and entity level,
which could influence organizational structure. Part IV concludes by
considering implications for the effectiveness and accountability of the
administrative state.
Economics 631 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 3d ed. 2000); infra Part III.
29
See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is A Nexus of
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. Corp. L. 819 (1999); Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976); Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate RiskTaking and Public Duty, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 26 (2016).
30
Infra Part III.A.
31
See Elizabeth Warren Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders, Wall
St. J., Aug. 15, 2018, at A17; Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose
(2018),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter;
Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That
Serves All Americans,’ BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/9K2F-2HLG;
Martin Lipton et al., It’s Time to Adopt the New Paradigm, Harv. L. Sch. Forum Corp. Gov.,
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/its-time-to-adopt-the-new-paradigm
On
shareholder primacy, see infra note 191 and accompanying text.
32
Infra Part III.D.
33
There is arguably a gap between rhetoric and reality. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock,
Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1997, 2042 (2014).
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I. TRADITIONAL FORMS OF THIRD-PARTY ENFORCEMENT
A decades-long debate in both corporate and administrative law scholarship
concerns “how best to tap the private interests of enterprise participants to serve
the public interest.”34 Historically, the starting point was the hope that firms
would self-regulate—if not for market incentives, then to avoid legal
punishment for wrongdoing.35 Although scholars recognize the heterogeneity of
external private enforcers,36 they have stopped short of examining the emerging
importance of how large firms are required to oversee third parties. I now turn
to those prior narratives of third-party private regulation.
A. Independent Enforcement
The origins of businesses influencing other businesses for the public benefit
lie in markets, rather than government. To see the public-private connection, it
is instructive to first consider how the administrative state functions. Regulators
have significant discretion in choosing which policymaking tools to deploy.37
Their most prominent tools include writing legal rules and filing lawsuits.38
However, as I have shown elsewhere, public regulators devote fewer resources
to these legal functions than to monitoring businesses through on-site
inspections and remote information collection.39 When monitoring activities
detect wrongdoing, the monitors—EPA inspectors, bank examiners, and
others—can respond in many ways outside the court system. Responses range
from informally requesting that businesses change behavior to mandating the
suspension of business activities.40 Private third-party enforcement has analogs
to each of these main policymaking functions, but especially to monitoring.
Independent of any legal influence, firms monitor other firms solely out of
self-interest. For instance, when land is the collateral for a loan, banks may
inspect the property periodically to ensure that the borrowing firm is not
releasing hazardous chemicals or otherwise damaging that collateral.41
Insurance companies also monitor the businesses that they insure to prevent
legal violations that would cause the insurer to make large payouts under the
34

Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93
Yale L.J. 857, 868, 857 (1984) ; sources supra note 23.
35
See Kraakman, supra note 6 at 56.
36
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note
37
M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1383,
1384–86 (2004).
38
Id. at 1384 (providing an overview of policy tools).
39
See Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 369, 408–12 (2019).
40
Id. at 373–75.
41
See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 Colum. L. Rev.
2029, 2053–55 (2005); see also Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 1262,
1321–22 (2013) (showing how banks influence other banks’ risk-taking).
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policy.42 The prospect of reducing costs motivates such monitoring, but the
monitoring advances public interest. These financial interests can push external
parties to “constrain fundamental managerial decisions even in the ordinary
course of business.”43
Another type of private enforcer is the self-regulatory organization, which
has been described as the new “fifth branch” of government but originates in
industry.44 Workers or companies in a given industry come together to form selfregulatory organizations. Traders formed the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), for instance, “to improve their business by excluding unreliable,
uncreditworthy, and unscrupulous brokers.”45
In recent decades, private entities increasingly regulated to advance social
causes for reasons beyond protecting their direct investments or members. For
example, Walmart imposes recycling and energy conservation requirements on
its vendors,46 and Nike and Apple audit their manufacturing facilities to prevent
child labor and other abuses.47 Although businesses originally developed these
types of programs mostly in response to negative publicity, firms are becoming
more proactive: “Firms are not merely the objects of activist boycotts. They are
becoming activists themselves.”48
A final category of market-oriented constraints involves certification
schemes. Organizations offer logos that tell grocery shoppers whether coffee,
fruit, and other products meet fair-trade and environmentally sustainable
standards.49 Logos leverage the consumers’ desire to motivate companies to
adhere to better standards. Solely out of private initiative, businesses monitor
other businesses in diverse ways.

42

See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen et al., Deepwater Drilling: Law, Policy, and Economics of Firm
Organization and Safety, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 1853, 1899 (2011); Shauhin A. Talesh, Insurance
Companies as Corporate Regulators: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 66 DePaul L. Rev. 463
(2017).
43
See Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private
Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 115, 120 (2009).
44
William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 Cornell L.
Rev. 1, 4 (2013).
45
Id.
46
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in
Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 913 (2007). But see Jonathan C. Lipson, Promising
Justice: Contract (As) Social Responsibility, 2019 Wis. L. Rev. 1109, 1110 (2019).
47
Barbara J. Fick, Corporate Social Responsibility for Enforcement of Labor Rights: Are
There More Effective Alternatives?, 4 Global Bus. L. Rev. 1, 5–6 (2014).
48
See, e.g., Light, supra note 27, at 139 (footnote omitted).
49
See, e.g., Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of
Current Scholarship, 41 Akron L. Rev. 1, 60 (2008); Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, The
Integrity of Private Third-Party Compliance Monitoring, Admin. & Reg. L. News, Fall 2016, at
22.
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B. Encouraged Enforcement
Although one motivation for voluntary regulation is to forestall public
oversight,50 the examples thus far cover situations in which private regulation
occurs independent of existing legal influence. Policymakers sometimes wish to
intervene but are reluctant to act paternalistically by forcing a private party to
act.51 Without mandating private enforcement, policymakers can still influence
private parties to regulate voluntarily. For instance, if the law imposes vicarious
liability on the pharmaceutical company for violations by its ingredient supplier,
the pharmaceutical company may be motivated to audit the supplier’s
production process even though auditing is not required.52
Another straightforward application of encouraged enforcement is requiring
companies to release product information in digital form so that intermediaries
can use that data to help consumers.53 Travel websites such as Expedia and
Travelocity benefitted from government mandates that airlines release flight
prices and times online.54 These intermediaries help to regulate by enabling a
marketplace filled with informed consumers, thereby deterring undesirable
business practices.55 Although legal authority made the information available, it
did not require any private actor to use that information to regulate.
Private parties can also voluntarily serve as enforcers by bringing lawsuits
or alerting authorities to legal violations. Private attorney general statutes in
many fields give citizens the right to sue to enforce public laws.56 These statutes
may offer the plaintiff monetary incentives to file the suit, by awarding them a
portion of any penalties paid by the offending company.57
Rather than filing the lawsuit, citizens and nonprofits may instead serve as
informants. Environmental watchdog groups patrol natural habitats to find
evidence of pollution, a practice that has increased with the availability of
powerful monitoring technologies.58 Whistleblower statutes serve a related
function by providing legal protections or monetary incentives for employees or
50

See, e.g., Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 44, at 14–15 (discussing the NYSE).
Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case
for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211, 1212 (2003).
52
Cf. Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 Yale L.J. 1231, 1255 (1984).
53
Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 Duke L.J. 1267, 1269–70 (2017).
54
See id.
55
See Van Loo, supra note 53, at 1269.
56
See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement,
2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 185 (2000).
57
See, e.g., id. at 216. Attorneys have monetary incentives to initiate lawsuits as well, which
plays an important role in some enforcement areas. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, SEC
Investigations and Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Comparison, 13 J. Empirical Legal
Stud. 27, 28 (2016).
58
See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 115, 209 (2004).
51
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third parties who come forward with information about wrongdoing.59
Scholars have also highlighted the instrumental role that contracts play in
voluntary enforcement.60 In particular, businesses enter into second-order
agreements voluntarily in response to or in the absence of regulation.61 Those
agreements result from private bargaining andserve to limit a firm’s risks of
incurring legal liability, such as from common law torts.62 Discretionary
inspections help not only to minimize legal violations, but also to receive lower
penalties per federal organizational sentencing guidelines.63 Without directly
mandating enforcement, policymakers have many options to motivate
businesses to monitor other businesses.
C. Mandated Enforcement
The law can require private enforcers rather than merely encouraging them.
“Corporate governance is often about gatekeeping,”64 which Reiner Kraakman
defines as situations in which a corporation must obtain the support of attorneys,
accountants, and others before taking certain actions.65 Instead of allowing an
oil company to decide whether to hire a third-party inspection service, for
instance, the regulator may instead write a rule requiring certification from an
accredited third-party inspector.66 Thereafter, oil companies would no longer
have the option of lowering costs by refusing to hire a third party. Statutes and
court orders compel businesses in diverse industries to hire third-party
monitors.67 Scholars believe that more of this “regulation by third-party
verification” could help to solve the problem of under-resourced public
regulators.68
It is important to note that any individual gatekeeper may have only partial
59

See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04;
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 922, 124
Stat. 1376, 1841–49 (2010) (adopting Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act); SEC, Annual
Report to Congress on Whistleblower Program 10 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2017annual-report-whistleblower-program.pdf.
60
Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 155, 155 (2000).
61
Vandenbergh, supra note 41, at 2030-31. But see Lipson, supra note x, at 1110.
62
Id. at 2033 & n.14.
63
But see Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 66 U.
Miami L. Rev. 321, 322 (2012) (“[T]hese provisions offer too little mitigation to encourage firms
to detect, report, and cooperate.”).
64
Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588, 622 (2003).
65
Kraakman, supra note 34, at 868 & n.28; see also Jonathan C. Lipson, Price, Path & Pride:
Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary Investigation), 3
Berkeley Bus. L. J. 59, 70-75 (2005) (discussing certifications in closing-opinion practice).
66
See Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory
Technique, 47 Admin L. Rev. 171, 173 (1995).
67
See id. at 17Root, supra note 5, at 529–30.
68
McAllister, supra note 23, at 5.
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ability to prevent wrongdoing. A private auditor might refuse to provide the
necessary approval for a fraudulent securities transaction, thus driving away one
potential buyer who sees the non-approval as a “red flag.”69 However, without a
requirement that the auditor disclose its findings, the securities seller may go to
another auditor and attempt to obtain approval anew.70
To illustrate further, for most of American history stock exchanges were not
gatekeepers. In the nineteenth century, the NYSE accounted for only a fraction
of the trades even in New York, because most deals unfolded “in brokers’
offices, in coffee houses, and in the street.”71 Reforms throughout the 1900s
gradually made the exchanges more attractive through licensing and other
regulation, and encouraged enforcement, but it was not until 1983 that a federal
law required every broker to register.72 The old gatekeepers’ influence depends
on the extent of the exclusion mechanism that the law provides.73
In light of gatekeepers’ prominent regulatory role, many scholars have
explored how the law should hold them accountable.74 In 2001, this issue
resurfaced when Enron, believed to be one of the most successful U.S.
companies, suddenly collapsed, destroying billions of dollars in shareholder
value and costing thousands of employees their retirement savings.75 The swift
downfall “stunned Wall Street” because Enron executives, alongside Arthur
Andersen, one of the leading auditing firms, made hundreds of millions of
dollars in losses look like a multibillion-dollar profit.76
Despite an academic consensus that insufficient gatekeeper liability
contributed to this incident of securities fraud, Congress’s main response, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, did little to address that issue.77 Instead, the Act instructed
the SEC to write rules overseeing auditors.78 It nonetheless required auditors to
“attest to, and report on, the assessment made by . . . management” of the
69

Kraakman, supra note 6, at 58.
Id.
71
Stuart Banner, Anglo-American Securities Regulation, Cultural and Political Roots,
1690-1860 256 (1998).
72
Act of June 6, 1983, Pub. L. 98-38, § 3, 97 Stat. 205, 206 (amending Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8)); Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 44, at 17–
20 (reviewing the history of exchange legislation).
73
Cf. A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 Va. L. Rev. 925, 992, 1019–20 (1999) (proposing
stock exchanges act as fraud monitors).
74
See Hamdani, supra note 6, at 107–08.
75
See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to Worldcom and Beyond: Life and Crime
After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 357 (2003).
76
Id. at 357, 369.
77
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 Bus. Law. 1403, 1409–12
(2002); Hamdani, supra note 6, at 55–56.
78
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, § 303, 116 Stat. 745, 778 (2002).
70
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company’s internal controls.79 The Act thus made auditors into mandated
whistleblower-gatekeeper hybrids to increase the likelihood that a public
regulator will learn of wrongdoing.
These diverse private actors—whether independent, encouraged, or
mandated—operate in parallel not only to one another, but also to business selfregulation and public regulatory oversight. For this reason, regulation should be
thought of in aggregate terms, in light of the mix of public and private actors.80
These actors form a regulatory ecosystem, sometimes called “nodal
governance,” with many players supporting and monitoring one another.81
D. What Is Missing
Despite widespread recognition of the pervasiveness and heterogeneity of
private enforcement, missing from these discussions is an examination of
mandates that explicitly direct regulated entities to serve as enforcers. Instead,
the focus has been on encouraging or mandating that other private parties help
enforce the law against regulated entities. In the rare instances when scholars
mention mandated third-party governance by the largest firms, it is in passing or
in narrower contexts, such as criminal statutory requirements that banks identify
money laundering transactions.82
As a result, although a rich literature on third-party enforcement spans
corporate and administrative law, scholars have yet to connect the firm’s
growing regulatory role to theories of the firm and debates about its proper place
in society. Monitoring in corporate law usually refers to internal contexts, such
as the board of directors ensuring that officers exercise their duties or that the
corporation obeys the law.83 Corporate law scholars have nonetheless
contributed valuable foundations, particularly by illuminating the centrality of
gatekeepers to corporate regulation.84
Administrative law scholarship also provides valuable foundations by
showing the evolution and growth of public-private collaboration.85 The
expansion of private enforcement from second-order to first-order firms not only
raises the accountability stakes identified in that literature but also creates new
dynamics. With more formal external oversight roles, the world’s most valuable
companies have the potential to profoundly shape governance, markets, and
79

Id. at § 404(b), 116 Stat. at 789.
Freeman, supra note 4, at 549.
81
Burris et al., supra note 49, at 25 ; see also Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private
Enforcement, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 285, 297 (2016).
82
See supra note 22.
83
See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996);
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985);Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:
The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547 (2003).
84
See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text.
85
See infra Part IV.
80
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norms.
II. CASE STUDIES
The ten largest companies operate in four main industries: information
technology, banking, pharmaceuticals, and oil.86 This Part considers how
regulators handle the largest companies in each industry. The industries with the
ten largest companies were chosen because their power and reach enable them
to exert influence on a broader swath of the economy than would smaller
companies. Additionally, when a prominent company is subject to an
enforcement action, its competitors adjust accordingly.87 These case studies
demonstrate how administrative agencies, after receiving authority from
Congress, have delegated some of that authority to the largest regulated entities.
A. The FTC and Big Tech
The FTC issued third-party oversight orders against Amazon, Facebook, and
Google, as well as other large technology companies such as Lenovo.88 The
greatest amount of detail available relates to the agency’s actions against
Facebook, the subject of two rounds of investigations. In 2012, the FTC finished
its original investigation of Facebook for violation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act’s prohibition on unfair and deceptive acts, concluding that the
social network had “deceived consumers by telling them they could keep their
information on Facebook private, and then repeatedly allowing it to be shared
and made public.”89 One of the FTC’s main concerns was how Facebook had
verified the security practices of third-party service providers.90
The enforcement order left Facebook’s responsibilities vague, but required
the submission of auditor reports.91 However, in the 2018 report, its auditor,
PricewaterhouseCoopers, summarized Facebook’s requirements imposed on
app developers by referring to Facebook’s publicly available policies.92
Facebook also submitted to the FTC a mandatory follow-up report on what it
86

See Fortune 500 List, supra note 10.
Griffith, supra note 9, at 2090.
88
See supra note 3 and accompanying text; Decision and Order, In the Matter of LenovoInc.,
No. C-4636 (F.T.C. Dec. 20, 2017).
89
See In the Matter of Facebook Inc., supra note 15; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
FTC Approves Final Settlement with Facebook (Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2012/08/ftc-approves-final-settlement-facebook.
90
In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., supra note 15, at 5–6. Facebook has treated app
developers as similar to service providers. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
Additionally, the FTC’s other agreements have signaled a broader expectation for regulated
entities’ oversight of third parties. See, e.g., In the Matter of Lenovo Inc., supra note 88 .
91
Id.15
92
See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age
of Surveillance, 72 Vand. L. Rev. 1563, 1600–01 (2019).
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had done to comply with each part of the commitment.93 The report detailed an
apparently extensive oversight program for third parties.94 Facebook might send
questionnaires to service providers to determine their security and privacy
practices.95 Depending on the answers to those questions, or merely the nature
of the data shared, Facebook would initiate more targeted security audits. Those
audits, which are sometimes conducted by Facebook and sometimes by a
security firm, “assess [] compliance with Facebook’s security guidelines.”96
Facebook uses these audits to determine, for instance, whether an app developer
complied with users’ requests to delete their personal data.97
After Cambridge Analytica accessed millions of users’ Facebook data to
promote Donald Trump’s election campaign, the FTC began investigating
Facebook to determine whether that incident involved violations of the 2012
settlement.98 Zuckerberg admitted that Facebook needed to better police app
developers, stating in his opening testimony to Congress, “It’s not enough to just
give people control over their information. We need to make sure that the
developers they share it with protect their information, too.”99
The FTC’s enforcement actions against Amazon demonstrate a different
gatekeeper approach. Amazon operates an app store populated with products
created and owned by third-party operators. These apps enable people on
Android phones or Kindle to play games, among other activities.100 While using
these apps, consumers buy products, for which the third-party app developers
set the prices and receive 70% of the payment.101 The developers control the
interface while consumers use the app, including the in-app purchases at the
heart of the FTC’s investigation.102 Amazon thus had little direct involvement in
the communications surrounding the disputed transactions.
Although Amazon does not operate the apps, induce consumers to make the
purchasing decision, or set the prices, and only keeps 30% of the payment, the
FTC treated the company as responsible for those purchases.103 It did so by
93
Facebook Compliance Report, In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., No. C-4365 (F.T.C. Nov.
13, 2012).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 10.
97
Facebook Platform Policy, supra note 89. App developers may be subject to Facebook
audits of their apps, systems, and records. Id.
98
See Steinmetz, supra note 2.
99
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg Hearing on Data Privacy and Protection, C-SPAN (Apr.
10, 2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/?443543-1/facebook-ceo-mark-zuckerberg-testifiesdata-protection (quoted language begins at 26:25).
100
F.T.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C14-1038-JCC, 2016 WL 10654030, at *1 (W. D.
Wash. July 22, 2016).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at *1, *11.
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focusing on two points of contact between Amazon and consumers. First,
Amazon operates the online store through which consumers purchase the
apps.104 With respect to this original purchase, Amazon did not make it clear
enough that in-app purchases would be possible.105 Amazon’s description of the
apps, available below the purchase button, included such information.106
However, Amazon imbedded the information in a long description of the app
below the purchase button and displayed it in smaller font.107 A federal court
agreed with the FTC that the notice of in-app purchases “was not
conspicuous.”108
Amazon’s second point of contact was the interface for making the purchase.
For many months, upon pressing a button that led to a purchase, Amazon
required no additional approval.109 The customer simply received a follow-up
email confirming the purchase.110 Amazon later displayed a prompt that asked
for a confirmation, sometimes requiring password entry, but only for purchases
over $20.111 Even the updated confirmation settings allowed children, in the
course of playing a video game, to make many purchases that individually were
under $20, but collectively produced large bills.112
Unlike the Facebook case, the FTC never reached a settlement with
Amazon.113 In 2017, the parties withdrew their appeals and announced a refund
program for injured consumers.114 The press release gave no indication that the
FTC would mandate ongoing oversight.115 That omission may reflect a new
approach under the Trump Administration, or possibly suggests that privacy
concerns command greater regulatory scrutiny of third parties than do monetary
harms. Regardless, to lessen the risk of future liability, Amazon must ensure that
third-party apps on its platforms do not deceive consumers.
B. The CFPB and Big Banks
Like banking regulators focused on financial stability, the CFPB could
104

Id. at *1.
Id. at *1–*2.
106
Id. at *2.
107
Id. at *2–*3, *10.
108
Id. at *10.
109
Id. at *2.
110
Id.. at *4–5.
111
Id. at *2.
112
Id. at *2, *4.
113
Press Release, FTC, FTC, Amazon to Withdraw Appeals, Paving Way for Consumer
Refunds Related to Children’s Unauthorized In-App Charges (Apr. 4, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/04/ftc-amazon-withdraw-appealspaving-way-consumer-refunds-related.
114
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115
Id.
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pursue its consumer protection mission by bringing enforcement actions directly
against third-party service providers.116 Instead, it has required banks to govern
third parties, including call centers, debt collectors, software developers, and
real estate lawyers.117 Tools for overseeing third parties are likely to become
even more important given the regulatory challenges created by the rise of
nonbank fintechs offering digital consumer financial services, typically in
partnership with traditional banks.118 The agency has brought third-party actions
against each of the four largest banks—JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Bank of
America, and Citibank.119
The bureau’s third-party enforcement policy began with its first enforcement
action. Capital One, one of the largest credit card issuers, contracted with an
independent call center which routed card holders with low credit scores—also
known as subprime borrowers—to different sales representatives when they
called Capital One.120 Those representatives talking with subprime cardholders
had a Capital One script for how to sell additional payment protection products,
but they frequently veered from the script.121 Some representatives inaccurately
described the add-on products as free, even though consumers collectively paid
about $140 million over a two-year period for the products.122 They also often
implied that the products were not optional.123
The CFPB found that the call center’s employees engaged in deceptive acts
116

12 U.S.C. §§ 1863, 1867(c) (2012) (granting third-party oversight to the Federal Reserve,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and other prudential regulators over third-party
services, such as accounting and computation, that a bank “causes to be performed for itself”)12
U.S.C. § 5514(e) (granting similar oversight authority to the CFPB over institutions offering
consumer financial services).
117
In the Matter of Dwolla, Inc., No. 2016-CFPB-0007 (Feb. 27, 2016),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201603_cfpb_consent-order-dwolla-inc.pdf (finding that
digital payment systems violated the law by failing to oversee third-party software developers);
Andrew Liput, What Real Estate Closing Attorneys Need to Know About the CFPB, the OCC,
and Third-Party Vendor Management Rules Affecting Residential Mortgage Transactions, 28
Prob. & Prop., Mar.-Apr. 2014, at 1–2.
118
On the challenges of regulating fintech, see Rory Van Loo, Technology Regulation by
Default: Platforms, Privacy, and the CFPB, 2 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 531 (2018).
119
Consent Order at 4–5, In the Matter of JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2013CFPB-0007 (Sept. 18. 2013); Consent Order at 10, In the Matter of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
CFPB No. 2018-BCFP-0001 (Apr. 20, 2018); Consent Order at 8, In the Matter of Bank of
America, N.A., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0004 (Apr. 7, 2014); Consent Order at 26, In the Matter
of Citibank, N.A., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0015 (July 21, 2015) [hereinafter CFPB-Citibank
Consent Order]; Consent Order at 7, In the Matter of Nationstar Mortgage LLC, CFPB No.
2017-CFPB-0011 (Mar. 14, 2017) (finding “inadequate ongoing monitoring of vendors”)
120
Stipulation and Consent Order at 3–4, In the Matter of Capital One Bank, (USA) N.A.,
CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0001 (July 16, 2012).
121
Id. at 4.
122
Id. at 5–6.
123
Id.
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and practices in violation of federal law.124 Although the bureau found no fault
with the script Capital One provided to the call center, it argued that “the Bank’s
compliance monitoring, service provider management and quality assurance
resulted in ineffective oversight which failed to prevent, identify, or correct the
improper sales practices.”125 The settlement required Capital One to submit to
the CFPB for pre-approval a written internal policy for implementing heightened
third-party oversight.126 Among other requirements, Capital One would conduct
“periodic onsite audit reviews … of the Bank Service Provider’s controls,
performance, and information systems” and retain the right to exit the contract
in the face of service provider noncompliance.127 Capital One also paid $25
million in penalties, but was “prohibited from seeking or accepting
indemnification . . . from any third party.”128 These indemnification-piercing
stipulations provide greater motivation for the enforcer-firm to do a thorough
job of monitoring and addresses the problem that many firms merely “windowdress” their compliance efforts without making a true effort.129
In its various cases and policy guidance, the CFPB has reinforced and
clarified these initial expectations for third-party governance. Not long after its
action against Capital one, the CFPB fined American Express for deceptively
collecting debts, charging excessive late fees, and discriminating based on
age.130 Third-party service providers committed all but one of the violations.131
Nonetheless, the agency explicitly faulted the board and senior management of
American Express for ineffective compliance management, “particularly” their
oversight of third-party service providers.132
Similar to the Capital One consent order, the enforcement action required
American Express to develop policies for monitoring its service providers’
compliance with consumer protection laws.133 But American Express also
agreed to have its compliance department submit quarterly reports to the board
on “whether Service Providers are in compliance” with all contracts, and the
consent order stipulated that “[t]he Board shall be responsible for ensuring that
corrective actions are taken….”134 The American Express consent decree thus
124

Id. at 8.
Id. at 4.
126
Id. at 22–23 (requiring also that any subsequent changes to this policy must obtain CFPB
approval).
127
Id.
128
Id. at 21.
129
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance,
81 Wash. U. L.Q. 487 (2003) (discussing compliance window-dressing).
130
American Express Consent Order, supra note 14, at 3–4(alleging misrepresentation
related to credit scores
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Id. at 5.
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Id. at 4.
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Id. at 17–19 (requiring consumer protection compliance review).
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Id. at 19.
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helped to put the industry on notice that the CFPB would expect the board of
directors to engage actively in the oversight of third parties.
Several years later, the CFPB went after a bigger target for its failure to
oversee third parties: Citibank, one of the four largest U.S. banks.135 Presumably
aware of the Capital One enforcement action,136 Citibank went further than
simply providing a script by also reviewing recorded telemarketer calls.137 The
telemarketing firm knew, however, which calls would be later reviewed for legal
compliance and used a misleading sales script only for unmonitored calls.138 The
CFPB ordered Citibank to adopt third-party oversight reforms and pay a $35
million penalty.139 The Citibank action illustrates how having an oversight
system in place is not enough—the oversight must produce results.
A rare case that went to trial produced more details about third-party
governance setups. The court order required the British multi-national bank
HSBC to audit samples of contracts between third-party service providers and
customers, to ensure that those documents comply with the law and that “only
fees and costs that are lawful, reasonable and actually incurred are charged to
borrowers.”140 Banks are also expected to oversee the processes and compliance
departments of third-parties.141
After four years of these enforcement actions, the CFPB issued a guidance
bulletin summarizing its expectations for third-party oversight. The bulletin
offers many details, including that the financial institution’s contracts and
compliance management system must include ongoing monitoring of third
parties.142
The CFPB’s settlements contain more detail than the FTC’s, since the FTC
did not specify which parties within Facebook—whether the compliance
department or the board of directors—must become involved**The CFPB also
plays a more active role in the implementation of such settlement requirements
by reviewing third-party governance policies before and after they are
implemented.143 Both agencies nonetheless rely on mandated enforcement by
135
Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability in an Era of Large
Banks and Complex Finance, 31 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 765, 782 (2012) (listing biggest banks).
136
Cf. In re Capital One Derivative S’holder Litig., 979 F. Supp. 2d 682, 697-701 (E.D. Va.
2013) (recognizing awareness of major legal actions in the same industry).
137
CFPB-Citibank Consent Order, supra note 119, at 12-13. It hired a private third party to
monitor compliance. Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 26–30, 45.
140
United States v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, No. 16-0199, 2016 WL 1688047, at *11
(D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2016).
141
Id.
142
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Compliance Bulletin and Policy Guidance; 2016-02,
Service Providers (Oct. 31, 2016).
143
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., BCFP Supervision and Examination Process Manual 7
(Mar. 2017),
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explicitly requiring large businesses to monitor for wrongdoing by third parties.
C. The EPA and Big Oil
The 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, which discharged billions of gallons
of oil into the Gulf of Mexico in one of the worst environmental disasters in U.S.
history, heavily shaped offshore oil regulation.144 BP Oil owned much of the
rights to the well’s oil, but in a straightforward sense, the problem began with
the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling platform, owned by Transocean, a
Swiss company.145 As the platform began to sink, it ruptured the pipe connecting
it to the well below, thereby causing the oil to discharge from the well thousands
of feet underwater at the ocean floor.146
If environmental regulators had applied the CFPB’s approach, they might
have brought an enforcement action against BP alone and mandated that it
monitor the other businesses it hired, such as Transocean. After all, BP Oil is
one of the ten largest companies in the world and hired the smaller Transocean
as a contractor, just as Citibank hired smaller independent call centers to perform
sales.147 Like Transocean, the call centers controlled the specific violations.148
The EPA and the DOJ instead brought enforcement actions against both BP
and Transocean.149 However, pursuing Transocean is arguably different from
pursuing call centers and app developers directly. Unlike call center operators
and many app developers, Transocean is not a small company.150 It is one of the
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/032017_cfpb_examinationprocess_supervision-and-examination-manual.pdf (“Compliance expectations . . . extend to
third-party relationships….”).
144
Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Deep
Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling – Report to the President (Jan.
2011) [hereinafter Deepwater Report], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPOOILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf.
145
The ownership rights came in the form of a lease, and two other companies also had
lessee ownership rights in the well, Anadarko and MOEX. Id. at 94.
146
See Order and Reasons as to Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment at 2, In re:
Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on April 20, 2010, No. 2:10md-02179-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2012), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201310/documents/deepwater-rulingonliability_0.pdf Deepwater Report, supra note 144, at 132.
147
See Deepwater Report, supra note 144, at 2; Global 500, Fortune,
https://fortune.com/global500/2019; supra notes 135 to 139 and accompanying text.
148
Supra notes 135 to 138 and accompanying text (discussing Citibank).
149
Complaint at 7–8, United States v. BP Expl. & Prod., No. 2:10-cv-04536 (E.D. La. Dec.
15, 2010) The EPA also brought actions against Anadarko and MOEX due to their investment
interests in the well. See Deepwater Horizon – BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, EPA [hereinafter
EPA Enforcement Actions], https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/deepwater-horizon-bp-gulfmexico-oil-spill (last visited Dec. 27, 2018).
150
ContactBabel, US Contact Centers in 2015: The State of the Industry & Technology
Penetration
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(3d
ed.
2015),
http://www.contactbabel.com/pdfs/apr2015/US%20SOITP%202015%20Marketing%20v1.pdf
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world’s largest operators of offshore oil rigs and as recently as 2017 was ranked
one of the 1,300 most valuable companies in the world.151 Thus, multinational
third-party oil contractors cannot escape regulatory scrutiny simply by working
with an oil producer that is considerably larger.
Nonetheless, the EPA and the underlying law still placed the bulk of the
responsibility on BP, which wound up paying close to $20 billion in regulatory
enforcement actions, compared to $1.4 billion for Transocean.152 Policy
foundations for this allocation can be seen in an early judicial opinion on
Deepwater Horizon liability. Finding the Clean Water Act’s specific liability
language to be unclear, the court relied on larger policy purpose, saying it was
“designed to place[] a major part of the financial burden for achieving and
maintaining clean water upon those who would profit by the use of our navigable
waters and adjacent areas and who pollute same . . . .”153 Those who profit most
are more likely to be valuable companies, giving them more resources to devote
to monitoring.
Environmental regulators do not only rely on the imposition of liability,
which by itself has led to extensive voluntary monitoring of firms by firms.154
Following the Deepwater Horizon incident, new regulations required offshore
oil operators to ensure that their contractors comply with environmental
standards.155 Regulators have expanded on those basic requirements through
lawsuits. In its Deepwater Horizon settlement, BP agreed to extensive
improvement of its third-party oversight, “including provisions related to
contractor oversight.”156 Those stipulated provisions include the creation of
Contract Governance Boards for both drilling and cementing operations, as well
as audits of contractors.157 The settlement required the BP board to oversee those
.
151

Global
2000
2017:
#1290
Transocean,
Forbes,
https://www.forbes.com/companies/transocean/#5fb61f6f15e0 (noting that Transocean dropped
off Forbes Global 2000 list in 2018).
152
See EPA Enforcement Actions, supra note 149.
153
Order and Reasons as to Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment at 20, In re: Oil
Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on April 20, 2010, No. 2:10-md02179-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. Coastal States Crude Gathering Co., 643 F.2d 1125, 1128 (5th Cir. 1981)),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-10/documents/deepwaterrulingonliability_0.pdf.
154
See Vandenbergh, supra note 41, at 2041 (showing pervasive second-order agreements).
155
30 C.F.R. § 250.1914(c)(1) (2013); Bureau of Safety & Envtl. Enf’t, Safety and
Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) Fact Sheet, https://www.bsee.gov/site-page/factsheet (last visited Dec. 27, 2018).
156
Consent Decree Among Defendant BP Exploration & Production Inc., the United States
of America, & the States of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, & Texas at 33, In re: Oil
Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on April 20, 2010, No. 2:10-md02179-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 2015).
157
Id. at app. 4, at 25.

22

Virginia Law Review (forthcoming)

[10-Jan-20

improvements, as well as their ongoing execution.158 These BP oversight
measures are separate from the various audits that private third parties other than
BP must also undertake of BP’s contracts.159 It is BP’s responsibility to ensure
that its contractors complete those independent audits.160
Transocean’s settlement imposed no explicit ongoing third-party monitoring
responsibilities on Transocean.161 The settlement referenced regulations
imposing broad safety management responsibilities, which include evaluation of
all contractors to ensure they operate according to safety environmental
management systems.162 But the referenced regulations have numerous other
requirements unrelated to third parties, and thus it would be a stretch to see the
settlement as mandating third-party monitoring.163 Still, the existence of those
regulations means that Transocean must, like BP, oversee all third parties with
which it contracts.
For oil refineries located on land, the EPA imposes similar oversight duties.
In a 2005 case, the EPA found that Exxon routinely emitted hazardous
pollutants, in violation of the Clean Air Act, in Illinois, Louisiana, and Montana
oil refineries.164 Among other stipulations, Exxon committed to an annual
“review of each contractor’s monitoring data which shall include, but not be
limited to, a review of: (i) the number of components monitored per technician;
(ii) the time between monitoring events; and (iii) abnormal data patterns.”165 The
EPA is not always so explicit about third-party oversight expectations. In
another Clean Air Act case, regarding similar violations in a manufacturing
facility in Texas, the EPA did not specify exactly how Exxon should monitor its
contractors.166 Instead, it stipulated that moving forward Exxon “will not raise
as a defense the failure by any of its officers, directors, employees, agents, or
contractors to take any actions necessary to comply with the provisions of this
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Consent Decree.”167 Exxon is also assumed to know everything that its
contractors and agents “knew or should have known.”168
Even when the EPA is less directive, as it was with Exxon, once the
agreement is in place imposing such clear responsibility for the acts of third
parties, government inspectors can fault the company if its contractor oversight
capabilities are found to be insufficient.169 Additionally, companies generally
look to the larger body of a regulator’s enforcement actions in deciding how to
implement internal systems.170 Thus, by mandating regular oversight of third
parties in some cases explicitly, the EPA can create industry-wide standards.
Either way, the largest oil companies—including their biggest contractors—
have been subject to direct mandates to oversee third parties involved in both
onshore and offshore oil activities.
D. The FDA and Big Pharma
Pharmaceutical companies manufacture drugs but contract with other
companies for “processing, packaging, holding, or testing.”171 The FDA has the
most explicit third-party monitoring expectations of the four case studies.
Rulemaking, guidance statements, and warning letters have communicated its
policy.
One FDA rule states that in every pharmaceutical company there “shall be a
quality control unit . . . responsible for approving or rejecting drug products
manufactured, processed, packed, or held under contract by another
company.”172 Monitoring the output is not, however, enough. The company must
also directly monitor inputs used by the contractor, including ingredients and
materials.173 After specifying the contractor’s internal compliance systems, the
manufacturer should conduct audits.174 Thus, the pharmaceutical company must
oversee contractors’ organizational processes, inputs and outputs.
The FDA places responsibility for third-party activities at the top of the
regulated entity. In its formal rules on liability for tainted products, the agency
states that it “regards extramural facilities as an extension of the manufacturer’s
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own facility.”175 It reiterated this point in its post-inspection warning letters.176
In other words, the pharmaceutical company is responsible for the third-party
contractor’s activities as if they were one company. In guidance documents, the
agency clarified that it was addressing “the relationship between owners and
contract facilities.”177
Contractual arrangements cannot shield pharmaceutical companies from
liability. In one warning letter, the FDA told Pfizer, the largest pharmaceutical
company in the world,178 “You are responsible for the quality of combination
products you produce as a contract facility, regardless of agreements in place
with [your customer] or with any of your suppliers.”179
The FDA does not, however, rely solely on Pfizer to regulate the company’s
independent contractors. The FDA still routinely inspects and brings
enforcement actions directly against those third parties. For instance, in one
warning letter to an independent manufacturer, the FDA wrote, “You and your
customer, Pfizer, have a quality agreement regarding the manufacture of drug
products. You are responsible for the quality of drugs you produce as a contract
facility, regardless of agreements in place . . . .”180
Pfizer implemented the FDA’s organizational advice into its internal
processes. It routinely monitors suppliers through audits, inspections, and
review of systems.181 Supplier agreements reflect these review procedures, and
when Pfizer recognizes a violation, it can de-list the offender from its list of
“qualified” suppliers or can report violations to the FDA.182
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E. Summary of Case Studies
Federal regulators have established an expectation that today’s largest
companies regulate independent contractual parties for legal violations. Through
direct enforcement actions or industry-wide mandates, the FTC, CFPB, EPA,
and FDA have required the most valuable companies to monitor and punish
third-party business wrongdoers. They serve as a new breed of gatekeepers
because the regulated entities must now decide whether to give the third parties
market access based on regulatory considerations.183 Sometimes this private
regulation benefits a specific party that will be contracting with one of the
businesses, such as a consumer, but other times the beneficiary is more general,
as in the case of environmental protection or financial stability.
The variations in approaches indicate design choices for new gatekeeper
governance. In the case of wrongdoing, should the regulator prosecute only the
enforcer-firm, or also the third party? How detailed of a gatekeeper mandate
should the regulator provide, and how closely should the regulator oversee the
enforcer-firm’s gatekeeping? And should the regulator develop the gatekeeper
governance model in a piecemeal manner through cases, or through more
explicit means, such as guidance documents and formal rulemaking?
Though focused on a subset of industries and companies to manage scope,
these case studies are part of a broader sphere of regulatory activity. These four
regulators alone have jurisdiction over other large parts of the economy. The
FTC, for instance, oversees retailers and other industries in addition to big
technology, and the FDA regulates food and supplement manufacturers.184
Additionally, other regulators deploy third-party mandated governance beyond
these four industries. The Interstate Commerce Commission, for instance,
obligates trucking operators to monitor contractual parties for roadway safety
compliance.185 A number of other federal and state laws similarly require
companies to play some regulatory oversight role with respect to third-party
businesses, including health care providers ensuring business associates
safeguard health data.186 Even if the regulatory state conscripted only the five
largest companies it would mean a substantial extension of regulatory
resources.187 But mandated enforcement is widespread enough to prompt a
broader inquiry into the implications for the firm’s evolving place in society.
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III. EXPANDING THE PUBLIC INFLUENCE ON THE FIRM
This Article aims primarily to illuminate the rise of mandated enforcement,
both its form and scope. Once recognized, however, this development implicates
prominent conversations and policy debates. By redrawing the lines between
public and private, mandated enforcement adds a new layer to some of the most
fundamental corporate law questions: How should the firm be conceptualized?
And what duties does it owe to society?
The firm has a decidedly private core, as implicated by its prominent
description as a nexus of contracts.188 Because the firm’s contractual foundations
are necessarily incomplete, corporate law fills in the gaps to reflect the parties’
intents.189 Some scholars have proposed giving greater weight in corporate
governance to a broader set of social issues, including employee rights or a
cleaner environment, and demonstrated how managers have discretion under the
business judgment rule to pursue these goals.190 Nonetheless, most
commentators and judges see the primary goal of corporate law as advancing
shareholder value.191
By some accounts, the depiction of the firm as a contractually-based private
entity helped advance the notion that government intervention in those private
agreements is “unnatural.”192 That line of reasoning views the firm’s “marketoriented nature” as serving “to dismiss the notion that the corporation owes
anything to the state.”193 Of course, the firm and its directors cannot pursue profit
illegally. Under Delaware law, for instance, the firm’s articles of incorporation
188
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cannot limit a director’s personal liability when the director commits a “knowing
violation of law.”194 Thus, the firm is private at its core, but public statutes define
the limits. The rest of this Part illustrates how mandated governance constitutes
a considerable expansion of that public side.
A. Conscripting the Firm as Regulator
Two of the most fundamental functions of administrative agencies are
writing and enforcing rules. Firms now perform each of these functions for the
public good. They do not undertake these activities voluntarily in response to
laws or market incentives, but by direct public mandate.
1. Writing Rules
Mandated enforcement puts the firm in a rulemaking role by compelling it
to write regulatory contractual clauses.195 Firms’ written contracts serve as a
principal vehicle for implementing third-party governance. For example, in its
FTC settlement, Facebook agreed to require “service providers, by contract, to
implement and maintain appropriate privacy protections” for any data obtained
from Facebook.196 When the company later submitted its required compliance
report, Facebook explained that it had implemented its third-party oversight
through its contracts.197 In particular, it developed a “Contract Policy” so that
agreements with third parties operate through Facebook’s “pre-approved
standard contract templates.”198 Facebook’s legal department “reviews contracts
that deviate from the pre-approved templates to help ensure that contracts with
applicable service providers contain the required privacy protections.”199 The
case of Facebook embodies a broader theme of regulator-mandated contract
clauses.
Consumer finance, pharma, and oil regulators also explicitly mention
contractual requirements. A CFPB guidance bulletin states that all financial
institutions should include “in the contract with the service provider clear
expectations about compliance, as well as appropriate and enforceable
consequences for violating any compliance-related responsibilities.”200 The
FDA expects pharmaceutical companies to detail in their contracts the shape of
194
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third-party suppliers’ compliance systems, and to reserve the right to audit these
systems.201 The EPA required BP Oil to include certain provisions in any new
contract with a drilling rig, including requiring the rig to join an industry safety
group.202 The firm’s contracts no longer contain only voluntary second-order
regulatory components made in response to regulation, but now also include
first-order clauses mandated by law.203
These mandated contractual clauses presumably become legally enforceable
against the smaller companies agreeing to them.204 Even if the counterparties do
not expect the contract to ever reach a courtroom, however, their terms can
define the contours of the ongoing relationship.205 Businesses refer to their
contracts for guidance as to their respective rights.206 Through their inclusion in
contracts, third-party enforcement clauses can influence many of the firm’s
relationships with external parties.207
More to the point, these mandates infuse a more significant public obligation
into the firm’s contracts. Motivated solely by profit and without any legal
influence, businesses have long inserted contract clauses that incidentally
advance the interests of consumers, the environment, or health.208 Even secondorder contractual clauses, inserted voluntarily in response to laws, still retain the
autonomy of contracting parties and therefore a heavy private component.209
Conversely, conscripted enforcement contracts impose more thoroughly public
obligations because businesses do not write them voluntarily.
Do contractual third-party governance clauses differ from other contractual
mandates? Various statutes influence the shape of particular contracts by
requiring them to include certain information. For instance, credit card
companies must prominently communicate the annual percentage rate, under the
Truth in Lending Act.210 The Uniform Commercial Code provides a default
warranty of merchantability and imposes a duty to act in good faith.211
Legislative limits on freedom of contract are neither new nor unusual.
Conscripted enforcement clauses need not differ from other contractual
mandates to mark a significant expansion of public influence on the firm’s
201
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contracts. However, those traditional mandates do, in fact, differ because their
most immediate beneficiary is one of the contracting parties. Arguably, these
restraints advance freedom of contract, in that they help one of the parties to
come to the agreement they would have wanted if both were economically
rational and informed.212 Disclosures, for instance, give information that both
parties would want entering into the transaction about the nature of what they
are receiving—such as the full cost of a loan, including fees.213 Those laws may
ultimately benefit the public by improving welfare through more efficient
market transactions, but they remain more clearly internal-to-the-contract in
terms of their direct beneficiary—one of the contracting parties.214
In contrast, mandated enforcement can benefit parties not involved in the
contract. These mandates require Facebook, Citibank, and Pfizer to protect
consumers by governing service providers and suppliers.215 Exxon and BP must
ensure that contractors safeguard the environment for the benefit of the public.216
Granted, one or both of the contractual parties also arguably benefit from these
requirements, by preserving their reputation and strengthening industry
standards.217 Also, consumer-oriented protections benefit a party that will
ultimately contract with the enforcer-firm—Facebook’s users, or Citibank’s
customers.218 The benefits to the contracting parties are less immediate and less
definite, however—nor do they motivate the clause.
Congress regularly passes laws that require some administrative agency with
rulemaking. Following the financial crisis of 2008, for instance, Congress tasked
the CFPB with writing numerous consumer protection rules.219 By analogy, in
the case of third-party governance, regulators arguably delegate some of the
rulemaking authority they receive from Congress to firms. Regulators could
write the specific third-party governance clauses that they want firms to include
in their contracts, but they do not. This non-directive approach reflects
regulators’ broader strategy of delegating complex decisions to private parties
due to limited information and resources.220
Instead, regulators provide general guidance regarding what the firm should
212
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include, such as instructing Google to require “service providers by contract to
implement and maintain appropriate privacy protections.”221 Although
companies do not normally release the text of their contracts, Facebook’s terms
state to app developers, “We or an independent auditor acting on our behalf may
audit your app, systems, and records to ensure your use of Platform and data you
receive from us is safe . . . .”222 Regulators thus, to varying degrees, let the firm
determine how best to write that clause. In short, by writing contract clauses
governing other private parties, businesses play a rulemaking role analogous to
what Congress expects of administrative agencies.
2. Enforcing Law
Mandated third-party governance also compels large firms to enforce the
law. In his testimony in front of the Senate, Zuckerberg was asked by one senator
why the company had not more closely monitored app developers and held them
accountable for violating Facebook’s privacy policies. Zuckerberg responded,
“Before, we’d thought that when developers told us that they weren’t going to
sell data, [that was] a good representation. But one of the big lessons that we’ve
learned here is that clearly, we cannot just take developers’ word for it. We need
to go and enforce them.”223
As mentioned above, federal regulators use ongoing monitoring as their
main enforcement tool, rather than simply bringing formal lawsuits.224 The FDA
and EPA conduct routine on-site inspections of laboratories and manufacturing
facilities, for instance, and the CFPB visits banks to examine their records.225
When the federal monitors—typically called inspectors or examiners—detect
wrongdoing, they often handle the problem directly without involving
lawyers.226
Mandated enforcement also emphasizes monitoring. Facebook “audits” app
developers as part of its consent order.227 Capital One must conduct “periodic
onsite audit reviews” of service providers.228 Pharmaceutical companies are
expected to reserve the right “to audit its contractor’s facilities for
compliance . . . .”229 Exxon is required by court order to review subcontractor
221
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monitoring data.230 Thus, by public mandate firms must undertake one of the
core functions of the modern public regulator.
In implementing regulatory monitoring, private firms face similar challenges
as public regulators long have. For instance, Volkswagen fooled regulators for
years into thinking its cars met emissions standards through software that
recognized when an emissions test was occurring and hid actual emissions
levels.231 Similarly, Citibank had an oversight regime that included reviewing
call centers’ phone conversations, but call center employees figured out which
calls would be audited and only veered from the mandated script on unmonitored
calls.232 Businesses now have incentives to evade the enforcer-firm’s detection
as they long have had for public regulatory policing.
In monitoring third parties, large firms also look for similar things as do
public regulators. A “critical component” of modern regulation is to move
beyond the identification of specific violations to ensure that companies have “a
robust and effective compliance management system.”233 This means
scrutinizing a company’s procedures to ensure a meaningful compliance
system.234 The enforcer-firm must also look for more than violations. As one
example, when Facebook monitors app developers for privacy, they examine
developers’ data security procedures.235
Enforcement must come with some kind of sanction. One pervasive
regulatory sanction is the ability to block access to the market, often through the
revocation of a permit or license.236 This gives regulators a potentially ruinous
enforcement sanction, even if they rarely use it.
Big businesses are expected to enforce using a similar gatekeeper function
by blocking access to markets. In one consent decree, the Comptroller of
Currency and other governmental entities required HSBC to “perform
appropriate due diligence” of “Third-Party Provider qualifications, expertise,
capacity, reputation, complaints, information security, document custody
practices, business continuity, and financial viability . . . . ”237 These factors
reflect what bank regulators consider in extending bank charters.238 More
broadly, regulators may require firms to screen third-party qualifications at the
230
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outset, and then to reserve the right to end the contract in the event of
misconduct.239 Like public regulators, large private firms wield powerful
blocking sanctions.240
Despite their private foundations, corporations increasingly must play a role
similar to the public regulator—both by writing rules for the benefit of the public
into their contracts with third parties and by actively monitoring and enforcing
those rules. This new role not only changes the descriptive account of the firm,
but promises to reshape corporate governance, liability, and structure.
B. Shaping Corporate Governance
Much of corporate law addresses the duties owed by officers and
directors.241 In public corporations, the shareholders do not exert day-to-day
control, but rely instead on the board of directors and the officers of the
corporation to run the business.242 Fiduciary law is one of the main ways that
shareholders can hold officers and directors liable if they manage the corporation
in a way contrary to shareholders’ interests.243 Other civil lawsuits may also be
brought against business leaders. This section looks at the implications of thirdparty mandates for personal liability and the corporate governance principles
that such liability seeks to promote.
In In re Caremark, the Delaware Chancery Court observed that “a director’s
obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate
information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists,
and that failure to do so under some circumstances may . . . render a director
liable for losses . . . .”244 Subsequent rulings have reinforced directors’ fiduciary
duty to ensure the corporation has reporting systems and controls that enable
them to monitor risks.245 But the bar is high for such liability.246 Directors do not
violate their fiduciary duty simply by overseeing a company with objectively
poor compliance systems, unless plaintiffs show that the directors’ oversight of
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(Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau Sept. 18, 2013).
240
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IV.A.
241
See William T. Allen & Reiner Kraakman, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of
Business Organization 229 (5th ed. 2016).
242
James D. Cox & Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Corporations § 9:1, at 2 (3d
ed. 2010).
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Id. § 10:1.
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In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
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See In re Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n Sec., Derivative, and “ERISA” Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d
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those systems was subjectively reckless or grossly negligent.247
How does third-party mandated governance alter board members’ duties to
shareholders? Shareholders tested that issue through a suit against Capital
One.248 Pointing to the CFPB’s aforementioned enforcement action,
shareholders first alleged that the board inadequately monitored the call
centers.249 The court noted that, under Delaware law, to establish a breach of
fiduciary duty in monitoring third parties plaintiffs must show that the board
operated in bad faith.250 Because Capital One had controls in place for call
centers, the court found that the plaintiffs did not plead sufficient facts to show
“‘a sustained or systematic failure of [the] board to exercise oversight’ or that
‘the board utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or
controls.’”251 The court ultimately dismissed the suit on summary judgment
because the plaintiffs did not put forth facts showing that the directors
“consciously chose not to remedy the misconduct.”252 State law may eventually
catch up, but the Capital One shareholder suit demonstrates how state corporate
law imposes lower duties than regulators do upon the board with regard to third
parties.253
Despite the lack of a strong influence on directors’ state law liability,
mandated third-party regulation could still alter corporate governance. By
specifying actions the board must take in the wake of settlements, administrative
agencies are dictating concrete board duties. In its settlement with Citibank, for
instance, the CFPB required the board to form a sub-committee focused on
compliance, and for that sub-committee to meet monthly, take minutes, and
submit quarterly reports to the CFPB’s regional director on the bank’s progress
overseeing third parties.254 Regulators’ detailed instructions put responsibility at
the top of the corporation for the ongoing oversight of third parties, leaving little
room for the board to claim ignorance.255
Although regulators are unlikely to prosecute officers and directors for thirdparty mandates, and insurance would normally shield many from paying
anyway,256 the mandates move business leaders toward personal liability for the
247
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acts of third parties under various statutes. For example, the Federal Trade
Commission Act holds individuals liable for a corporation’s deceptive acts if the
individual possessed authority to control the acts and knew or should have
known about them.257 Since many settlement agreements and guidance
documents require the board of directors or officers to oversee third-party
compliance and to receive reports,258 regulators are essentially ordering them to
have control and knowledge. Some regulators, including the CFPB and FTC,
have pursued actions against individuals for failed supervision of third parties.259
Individuals within the firm thus may in the future face greater personal liability
for the acts of third parties as a result of current mandates to monitor and
influence those third parties.260
More broadly, the mandates may still influence board members’ conduct
even if personal sanctions are unlikely. Enforcement actions against firms drove
the explosion in many large corporations’ compliance departments, which now
often rival the legal department in size and influence. Those large compliance
departments often retain some formal relationship with the board.261 The
emergence of specific requirements for third-party oversight could similarly
shape industry norms for the board’s oversight of other external companies.262
Put differently, regulators are moving the bar set by corporate law’s
compliance duties imposed on boards for third-party oversight. By requiring the
firm to oversee third parties for legal compliance, regulators inevitably implicate
those ultimately responsible for running the firm, including owners, board
members, and managers. Regulators’ specific requirements for board conduct,
reaching details such as minutes and compliance plan approval, mean that even
boards that have yet to be subject to enforcement actions operate in reference to
them in managing their compliance programs. Mandated enforcement may
overcome the formidable shield from liability that the state law business
judgment rule, and other waivers,263 have provided to the board of directors.
C. Altering Entity Liability and Structure

Fed. Trade Comm’n v. IAB Mktg. Assocs., LP, 746 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2014).
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F. Supp. 3d 757, 773 (N.D. Ill. 2016);
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Legal liability plays a prominent role in corporate law. By some leading
accounts, the limitation of liability is the defining characteristic of the
corporation and has driven its structural evolution.264 Regulators’ approach to
third-party regulation has increased the firm’s liability for the acts of other
businesses.265 That shift in liability implicates the firm’s entity-level liability,
which could alter the corporate structure in ways that policymakers did not
intend.
Mandated third-party governance could change large companies’
organizational structures. In recent decades, many businesses have outsourced
activities previously conducted in-house.266 Diverse considerations drive the
decision to outsource, including cost savings and an enhanced ability to monitor
remote parties,267 but some scholars have concluded that one goal as lessening
the risks of legal liability.268 Regardless of the motivation for the original
outsourcing, the third-party service provider typically contractually shields the
outsourcing firm from lawsuits.269 For instance, a debt collector indemnified cell
phone carrier Sprint from “all claims, damages, losses, liabilities, costs,
expenses and reasonable attorney’s fees” related to its collection services.270
Third-party mandates could make outsourcing less attractive if they remove
some of these legal protections. As discussed above, this governance shift
already prevents many of the largest companies from delegating away liability
for public prosecution.271 That fact alone presumably makes outsourcing less
264
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See supra Part II.
266
See, e.g., Penncro Assocs., Inc. v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 499 F.3d 1151, 1152 (10th Cir.
2007) (explaining how Sprint began outsourcing its collection services).
267
See George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE
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attractive in terms of shielding from third-party liability.
Outsourcing would become even less attractive if it stopped insulating the
firm from private lawsuits. Agency law provides a primary avenue for private
parties holding firms liable for the acts of third parties. The more a business
controls the acts of another, the more likely courts will find the business to be
the principal liable for an agent’s acts.272 Various other statutes also provide a
private right of action against companies for acts by third parties they control,
such as for unfair and deceptive acts committed against consumers.273 The more
Verizon controls the acts of the telemarketer, for instance, the easier it is for a
customer harmed by the telemarketer to sue Verizon, rather than the
telemarketer. Outsourcing may provide less protection from liability in private
lawsuits if third-party mandates closely map those considered by courts in
determining control. In analyzing whether a third party, such as a telemarketer,
is an agent, courts cite activities such as monitoring and editing the script used
by telemarketers as demonstrating control.274 Yet regulators often mandate
third-party monitoring and explicitly require the implementation of “controls”
over third parties.275 It follows that conscripted enforcement may move the firm
into a position of control sufficient for courts to hold the firm liable for the acts
of third parties. In other words, the new gatekeepers may prompt a resurgence
of respondeat superior liability.
The additional risk of liability possibly imposed by third-party mandates
might change the outsourcing calculus. Purchasing the service provider would
not necessarily impose more liability. In United States v. Bestfoods, the EPA
sued a parent company under common law liability for the cleanup costs of
hazardous waste disposed of by a subsidiary.276 The Court reasoned that
something more than ownership control was needed to hold the parent liable
under the common law.277 Direct involvement by the parent company in the
wrongdoing is needed.278
Although purchasing a subsidiary thus would not necessarily increase
liability for the wrongdoing of the subsidiary, it could facilitate monitoring. As
an independent company, the service provider would be reluctant to share
similar limitations on delegation. See supra Parts II.B. & II.C.
272
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273
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private information with its client. Companies generally guard private
information closely, and if the client later used a different service provider,
oversharing information could reduce the original service provider’s
competitive advantage. When the service provider is a subsidiary, however, the
need for secrecy diminishes.
Thus, mandated third-party governance may cause businesses to either
purchase the third-party service provider or develop a new service provider as a
subsidiary to facilitate more effective monitoring. This assumes that the firm
believes more effective monitoring would decrease the likelihood that the
service provider will engage in wrongdoing. If so, pervasive mandated
enforcement could thereby influence firms’ organizational structures.
D. Strengthening the Public Duty
Conscripted enforcement informs debates about what duties businesses owe
to society. Firms must refrain from violating laws, but they usually do not need
to take any particular action to benefit the public.279 A strong norm discourages
“unwarranted ‘social’ obligations on private enterprise.”280
Industry-specific exceptions do exist, however. Utilities and common
carriers must offer cable, Internet, electricity, and gas services at comparable
prices even to unprofitable customers, such as inhabitants of rural
communities.281 Under the Community Reinvestment Act, banks must extend
credit in underserved neighborhoods.282 Disparate state and federal laws obligate
hospitals not to exclude patients.283
Unlike banks’ and utilities’ requirements to help some sector of the public,
third-party mandated governance is not limited to companies offering essential
services or serving as common carriers.284 It thus reaches a broader swath of the
economy.285 Additionally, those essential services providers can fulfill the
mandated public act by offering their core product—even for compensation.286
In contrast, conscripted enforcement requires a public action other than offering
279
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the firm’s core product, and without compensation, thus bringing the firm further
outside its sphere of private enterprise.
Third-party mandates differ from the drastic growth in mandated internal
compliance. Compliance departments have until now largely been seen as
internally focused.287 Conversely, third-party mandates are externally focused.
That distinction matters because mandating internally focused compliance
departments can be seen as merely a new mechanism for requiring the firm to
do what it was always expected to do—regulate itself.
Although different in fundamental ways, conscripted enforcement is part of
a broader shift that includes compliance departments, community reinvestment
requirements, and the SEC’s expanded substantive corporate law authority
through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.288 These and related developments have over
time marked greater federal intervention into corporate governance and
operations.289
Conscripted governance adds a substantial new layer by allowing a large
number of federal agencies beyond the SEC to shape the firm’s relationships,
contracts, board activities, and liability. In debates about what duties the firm
owes to society, appeals to the private nature of the firm are less persuasive in
light of this extensive public influence. Other arguments against government
overstepping, such as the efficiency implications of regulatory burden, retain
their force and underscore the importance of weighing broader economic
tradeoffs in designing corporate governance interventions.290 However, as a
descriptive matter, policymakers are proceeding as though the firm has a duty to
act affirmatively in the public good.
IV. EXPANDING THE PRIVATE BRANCH OF THE REGULATORY STATE
The central preoccupation of administrative law is the accountability of
unelected bureaucrats.291 The effectiveness of administrative decisions is also
287
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crucial to administrative law.292 Scholars have already extended those projects
to the growth in private governance.293 This Part begins to map the normative
path forward for integrating the enforcer-firm into the regulatory state.
A. Effectiveness of the Enforcer-Firm
A central question in business regulation is what set of incentives would
optimally deter wrongdoing. The law can influence deterrence chiefly by
adjusting the severity of the penalty or the likelihood of detection.294 Studies of
optimal deterrence have produced inconclusive results.295 That indeterminacy
will undermine any efforts to draw firm conclusions about the attractiveness of
the enforcer-firm. Nonetheless, since the enforcer-firm is a new tool for
deterrence, it is necessary to consider when to deploy it.
One straightforward reason for use of the enforcer-firm is inadequate
regulatory resources. The firm’s compliance department plays a major role in
enforcement.296 In many public corporations today, the compliance group has
grown to rival the legal department in size and influence.297 At Goldman Sachs,
the number of people in compliance more than tripled between 2004 and 2016,
to about 950.298 But the CFPB has only 416 personnel in its monitoring group to
conduct examinations of Goldman Sachs, Citibank, and many other large
banks.299 As another example, Facebook recently hired thousands of new
compliance reviewers, while its main regulator, the FTC, has only 1,100
employees total.300 By conscripting even a fraction of large companies’
compliance departments to enforce, policymakers can dramatically expand the
292
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administrative state’s regulatory workforce. In deciding whether that expansion
is beneficial, observers will come to differing conclusions depending, in part, on
whether they view current public regulatory resource levels as adequate.
Putting the question of adequate resources aside, there remain other tradeoffs
in determining when it would be ideal to regulate directly rather than through
the enforcer-firm. A sensible signal for when the enforcer-firm might prove
more effective at regulating than a government entity is the presence of superior
information or sophistication. A major concern about regulation is that
bureaucrats have insufficient skills or information to keep up with the private
sector.301 Observers mention regulators’ predicted inability to understand
complex algorithms, for instance, as a counterpoint to calls for public regulation
of Amazon, Facebook, and other tech giants.302 Additionally, since traditional
gatekeepers do not produce the product subject to regulation, they are less
familiar with the intricacies of fast-moving, technical industries.
Most enforcer-firms already have greater access to information about their
counterparties, through the regular course of business, than would regulators.
This informational criterion also suggests that the enforcer-firm fits best with
the types of activities already related to its interactions with the third party, or
that “touch and concern” it.303
To be clear, the firm is not necessarily an expert in all that the service
provider does—indeed, a lack of expertise sometimes motivates a firm to
outsource.304 For instance, banks have found the task of monitoring third-party
vendors extremely difficult, particularly fintechs and others providing complex
artificially intelligent services, such as chatbots, credit monitoring, and fraud
detection.305 Nonetheless, regulatory understanding exists along a spectrum.
Given large firms’ resources, talent, information access, and expertise, they will
in many contexts deliver a monitor better situated to keep pace.
The informational advantages speak not only to the ability to detect
wrongdoing, but also the cost of doing so. A chief criticism of regulation is that
it increases transaction costs.306 In highly fragmented industries, the regulator
301

Roy Andrew Partain, Public and Private Regulations for the Governance of the Risks of
Offshore Methane Hydrates, 17 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 87, 117–18 (2015).
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faces greater difficulty monitoring all entities than in a concentrated industry
with a small number of large businesses.307 It requires expenditures to establish
communications, travel to the site of so many businesses, and understand
institutional idiosyncrasies. Unlike administrative agencies and third-party
inspectors, the enforcer-firm already is in contact with its counterparties and
already has a high baseline level of expertise, meaning that it can spend less to
collect information and develop expertise.308 The regulated third party also then
spends less on transferring and explaining information. The enforcer-firm can
thereby lower the cost of regulation.
Regulatory informational savings are only part of the efficiency analysis.
Efficiency would be improved if new gatekeeper governance caused the
enforcer-firm to better internalize the full costs of its business activities. But if
enforcer-firms responded by bringing external services in-house, it could either
increase or decrease efficiency. If cost savings or other business advantages
would otherwise drive the firm to rely on external service providers in the first
place, then those losses from insourcing would need to be compared to the gains
from increased compliance and regulatory informational savings. If instead the
avoidance of liability is the sole reason for the firm to use some specific external
services, then insourcing in response to new gatekeeper governance would not
necessarily prove inefficient.309
A further efficiency complication arises because some of the compliance
information needed may be competitively sensitive. Amazon is notorious for
hiring outside businesses—whether cloud computing providers, small clothing
manufacturers, or shipping companies—and then ultimately deciding to take
those products or services in-house after having had the chance to study them
closely.310 By forcing the sharing of sensitive information, gatekeeper
governance could facilitate anticompetitive displacement or takeover of service
providers, and even encourage enforcer-firms to become inefficiently large.
In the alternative, the sensitivity of information may cause service providers
to avoid sharing crucial monitoring information with the enforcer-firm. If the
monitor is instead an administrative agency or private inspection firm, the risks
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are less concerning because the monitor would not be a potential competitor.311
Information is the “lifeblood” of effective governance.312 When sensitive
information is necessary for monitoring compliance, a public option or thirdparty monitor may prove more effective or at least necessary as a complement
to the enforcer-firm.
Another risk is that dispersed regulators create problems with overlapping
jurisdiction. There is evidence that administrative agencies with overlapping
jurisdiction are less likely to act, partly because each feels less pressure.313 By
analogy, the public regulator, the firm, and the service provider have
overlapping jurisdiction. As a result, each may assume someone else is paying
adequate attention. Strategic shirking is also possible, since the multiple
businesses working with any given service provider may realize they can benefit
from other businesses’ monitoring of that same service provider without
incurring the costs of rigorous monitoring.314
The possibility of shirking reflects a broader concern that the enforcer-firm’s
monitoring may serve merely a “cosmetic” function—allowing the firm to show
regulators that it is doing something, and thereby defend itself from regulatory
liability, without actually exerting considerable influence.315 One FTC lawsuit
uncovered email evidence that a health care industry company’s written
reprimands of third-party telemarketer misconduct may have been all about
appearances.316 The company’s representative assured the telemarketer after
sending compliance emails, “I just have to cover all bases so nobody can say
that I never told them lol.”317
This concern about shirking indicates that the regulatory cost savings and
sophistication advantages in using the enforcer-firm should be adjusted for any
public resources needed to oversee the enforcer-firm. Still, administrative
agency oversight represents another area in which the enforcer-firm has inherent
advantages over traditional gatekeepers. With private inspectors, accountants,
self-regulatory organizations, or auditors, agency oversight of the private
enforcer would require interacting with additional entities. Those interactions
would necessitate devoting agency resources to communicating with,
311
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understanding, and prosecuting new institutions. In contrast, the agency already
oversees the enforcer-firm, and could merely add gatekeeper-related oversight.
Public accountability of the enforcer-firm is thus lower cost and more likely to
occur than for many traditional gatekeepers.318
A final drawback is that the enforcer-firm’s sanctions are more limited than
that of an administrative agency. The enforcer-firm’s main sanction is exit: if
the third party is in violation, the firm can stop doing business with the service
provider. That punishment is far narrower than those available to the public
regulator, and still allows the third party to do business with other firms. Over
time, the typical enforcer-firm may wield more substantial sanction power as
industries become more concentrated.319 But when the service provider serves a
large number of clients, as many do, exit becomes less harmful.320
This limitation on the enforcer-firm raises questions about its potential use
in peer-to-peer settings. Often two large companies work closely together and
surely have informational advantages—thus providing the possibility of cost
savings by relying on them to police one another. Facebook, for instance, allows
Amazon, Netflix, and Microsoft to access user data, including the ability to read
private messages.321 The expansion of the enforcer-firm to oversee peers could,
in theory, decrease the resource and information gap between regulator and
regulated entity even further.322 Peer-to-peer gatekeepers may still have a
regulatory role to play, but such relationships depend on gatekeepers with less
relative power. Overall, regulators may need to be more involved as the
enforcer-firm’s market power diminishes with respect to the counterparty.323
Part of the problem with assessing these diverse costs and benefits is that the
largest firms remain untested as external regulators. In contrast, research
demonstrates that public regulators’ monitoring promotes compliance. In one
study, increasing the frequency of EPA inspections lowered pollution from
factories by about three percent.324 Policymakers would benefit from similar
research on the enforcer-firm’s benefits and which of the diverse institutional
design models, outlined above, are most effective. But there are sufficient
examples of public regulators, private third-party monitors, and self-regulation
318
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failing.325 A crucial variable in any such analysis is the potentially substantial
costs imposed on the enforcer-firm and its counterparties.
In short, the question of whether the enforcer-firm is better than other
regulators will hinge on factors that include information access, the sensitivity
of the regulatory information needed, the power that the enforcer-firm has over
its counterparty, the organizational efficiency of outsourcing, and the societal
gains from increased compliance. In theory, in the absence of direct empirical
study, large firms’ greater information and sophistication should make them
more cost-effective than a public regulator or new class of private third-party
regulators performing the same function.
Difficult design questions remain about which party should be incentivized
to what degree—the enforcer-firm or its counterparties. Another fundamental
choice is whether explicit governance mandates for the enforcer-firm are needed
beyond leveraging indirect liability, vicarious liability, and strict liability. Also,
legal reforms could address some of the enforcer-firm’s downsides. To increase
sanctions, the law could give it a private right of action against the third-party
for noncompliance. Or the law might require the enforcer-firm to report
violations.326 Greater antitrust attention to the enforcer-firm would help ensure
it did not abuse its position and any access to sensitive information.
In assessing the enforcer-firm, it is important to be realistic about the
alternatives. The practical choice may not be between public monitors and
enforcer-firm, or between the enforcer-firm and the old gatekeepers. Industry
lobbying may block congressional allocation of adequate public resources to
oversee a large universe of smaller third-party firms.327 Given these resource
constrains, the real-world question may simply be whether the enforcer-firm,
despite its imperfections, is better than no direct oversight of dispersed third
parties. Assuming that greater compliance with those laws is desirable, the
enforcer-firm offers a promising avenue for more effective regulation.
B. Accountability of the Enforcer-Firm
A central administrative law concern about prior generations of privatization
is that they “insulate” the government from accountability because the public
has limited visibility or interaction with the private entity.328 The delegation of
regulatory responsibilities to the enforcer-firm can further insulate from
accountability. It is therefore worthwhile to consider how the public can ensure
that enforcer-firms are promoting compliance. Three potential responses would
325
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be through courts, private actors, and administrative agencies.329
Judicial review provides a check against industry capture of bureaucrats.
Enforcer-firms can write monitoring contracts or make enforcement decisions
free from accountability mechanisms that apply only to government, such as the
Administrative Procedure Act330 and the Freedom of Information Act.331 A
concern would be that by delegating regulation to the enforcer-firm, the state
allows large firms to write and enforce rules to cement or further concentrate
existing market shares, thereby harming smaller firms and new entrants. In the
absence of a clear statutory mechanism for review, one existing proposal would
have courts hold delegations unconstitutional if the agency imposes inadequate
constraints on the private actor.332
Overall, solutions relying on the nondelegation doctrine seem unlikely.
Congress must only provide “an intelligible principle” within lawful bounds,333
a lenient standard that has traditionally proved highly tolerant of government
delegations to private parties.334 However, courts have occasionally indicated
hostility for “empowering private parties to wield regulatory authority”335 and
indicated the need “to subject private delegations to a more searching scrutiny
than their public counterparts.”336 Most prominently, in Department of
Transportation v. Association of American Railroads the Supreme Court
avoided ruling on the nondelegation issue by holding that Amtrak was a
government actor, but in a concurring opinion Justice Alito observed that
“handing off regulatory power to a private entity is legislative delegation in its
most obnoxious form.’”337 It is thus not inconceivable that the nondelegation
doctrine might at some point gain relevance to the enforcer-firm.
Others have explored imposing constitutional constraints on businesses as
state actors under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.338 The
most relevant tests for a state actor seem immediately applicable to the enforcerfirm—“joint participation” sufficient for interdependence, a sufficient “nexus”
329
Executive review plays a related anti-capture function. Michael A. Livermore & Richard
L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 Geo. L.J. 1337, 1340 (2013).
330
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
331
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2018).
332
On agency reliance on private actors as delegation, see Metzger, supra note 4, at 1370.
333
See Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
334
See Freeman, supra note 4, at 589–90 (reviewing cases upholding privatization).
335
See Ass’n of Am. Railroads v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2013),
vacated and remanded sub nom, Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225
(2015).
336
See Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 469 (Tex.
1997) (“[C]ourts should subject private delegations to a more searching scrutiny. . . .”).
337
See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1233–34, 1238 (2015)
(Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936)).
338
See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization,
35 UCLA L. Rev. 911, 915 (1988).

46

Virginia Law Review (forthcoming)

[10-Jan-20

between the private and public actor, and performance of a “public function”
traditionally exclusively reserved for the state.339 But courts have consistently
found that private companies failed these tests, even when involved in activities
with a heavy public component, such as operating electric utilities and nursing
homes.340 Self-regulatory organizations like the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA), which is congressionally authorized to protect investors,
present a closer case but courts still do not usually see them as state actors.341
It is worth considering whether it matters that—unlike utilities and nursing
homes—the enforcer-firm is engaging in a public service outside of its normal
business operations.342 While that distinction could be relevant, and deserves a
more extensive analysis, the “protections courts afford those affected by private
decisions, and the scope of judicial review they provide, remain minimal.”343 If
the enforcer-firm produces similar judicial outcomes as other private enforcers,
the administrative state has another large area of governance that will likely
proceed unconstrained by judicial review.
Private actors present another possibility for holding the enforcer-firm
accountable. For some perspective, it is instructive to consider again how the
regulatory architecture differs between enforcer-firms and more traditional
private enforcement models. When lawyers, accountants, and auditors serve as
gatekeepers, the entity they are regulating is the one paying their bills.344 That
client relationship makes it easier for the firm to capture the gatekeeper—in the
sense of influencing it to enforce lightly—because the gatekeeper has financial
interests in keeping the client happy.345 With the enforcer-firm, however, the
gatekeeper pays the service provider’s bills—perhaps indirectly, as in the case
of Amazon and Facebook, by providing some crucial access to users.346 If “the
client is king,”347 the old gatekeepers are subjects, while the new gatekeepers
are royalty. Enforcer-firms should thus prove inherently more resistant to
capture, and more independent, than hired monitors.
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Moreover, in contrast to the old gatekeepers, the enforcer-firm deals directly
with consumers. As a result, some enforcer-firms’ employees will have more of
a natural affinity for consumers, and thus potentially some of the groups needing
protection from the laws to be enforced. Also, consumers have a means of
directly affecting most enforcer-firms, by taking their business elsewhere. That
direct relationship enables advocacy, such as consumer boycotts, that has pushed
businesses toward compliance in other contexts.348 It also at least partly
addresses some of the concerns in the literature that the old gatekeepers “are
biased away from the public interest simply because close affinity with the client
renders the desired independence psychologically impossible.”349
There are many shortcomings with relying on markets to hold private firms
accountable. A customer can easily choose another coffee shop or store, but it is
harder for a consumer to switch banks or social networks.350 There may not be
many other options for digital products, and if there are it would take time to
learn a new interface and all of one’s pictures, posts, and contacts may not be
readily portable to the new system.351 Indeed, when consumers have little choice
the enforcer-firm may care less than traditional gatekeepers about reputation,
and thus worry less about the public shaming aspect of violations.352 Thus, one
consideration for whether to mandate enforcement may simply be the ease of
exit: the more easily consumers can switch to competitors, the greater the
accountability enforcer-firms face.353
Moreover, for consumers to hold the enforcer-firm directly accountable, they
must have both visibility into the firm’s enforcement and the ability to assess its
efficacy. Visibility implicates one of the primary mechanisms for administrative
accountability: transparency.354 Greater transparency into the firm’s role as
enforcer could come in any of the forms used currently for administrative
agencies, such as annual reports on enforcement activities.355 Many firms would
likely not release such information voluntarily, however. Public transparency for
the enforcer-firm would depend on mandates, or alternatively on public
regulators releasing summaries of enforcer-firms’ activities.
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For the public to hold the conscripted enforcer accountable based on that
information, however, people must also be able to assess its efficacy, which may
prove difficult except in cases of extreme failure. Behavioral law and economics
has demonstrated how consumers ineffectively weigh various shrouded
attributes in a product, such as the warranty or fees.356 It cannot be ruled out that
some kind of independent grading scale, akin to restaurant health scores, could
facilitate consumer-driven accountability. Still, in many industries, including
banking and technology, consumers rarely switch because of the time and costs
of doing so.357 Given challenges related to information, decision making, and
switching, consumer spending and advocacy likely provide only a limited
additional layer of accountability for the enforcer-firm.
These legal and nongovernmental shortcomings underscore the importance
of active administrative agency oversight of the enforcer-firm. The CFPB
provides one such model because it routinely checks whether financial
institutions are overseeing third parties. For instance, as part of its routine
examinations the CFPB found that credit reporting agencies engaged in
“insufficient ongoing monitoring, or re-vetting” of third-party furnishers of
credit data.358 With that message delivered industry-wide, credit agencies
adjusted their internal processes enough that two years later the CFPB
concluded, “In recent follow-up reviews, we determined that these policies and
procedures have improved.”359 Improvements included “monitoring for
furnishers that do not comply” and enforcement mechanisms such as “ceasing
to accept data from furnishers.”360 The CFPB thus not only examines enforcerfirms’ monitoring, but also communicates some of its findings to the public.
This Part’s discussion is not meant to be an exhaustive list of the factors
influencing the enforcer-firm’s effectiveness and accountability. Additional
risks include the possibility that the state relies too much on self-serving firms
to regulate, thereby diminishing agencies’ expertise or prompting Congress to
allocate suboptimal resources. Another risk is perverse incentive for regulators
to prefer concentrated industries with large companies because they facilitate
regulation and wield more powerful sanctions, thus putting mandated
enforcement even further in tension with antitrust.361
More broadly, expanding the state’s ability to coopt businesses implicates
356
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more universal governance problems, such as how to prevent regulatory
arbitrage and how to control a nefarious government wielding additional power.
Those problems help motivate many existing checks on the administrative state.
It may be necessary to extend analogous checks to enforcer-firms, such as
requiring the inspector general to investigate them. These and other
effectiveness and accountability implications are ripe for systematic study.
Overall, as a regulatory tool, conscripted regulators offer a number of
potential advantages over prior privatization models. They present the
possibility of greater efficiency, expertise, and responsiveness to consumers.
Designed poorly, however, they risk creating a vast sphere of regulatory
arbitrage out of public sight and judicial review. A crucial feature is ensuring
that an administrative agency watches the new gatekeepers.
CONCLUSION
The public role of the firm and the private reach of the administrative state
expand farther than is commonly understood. With large companies’ immense
resources at their disposal, administrative agencies now direct a large shadow
regulatory workforce. That development offers some promise of filling in the
regulatory policing gap left by resource-deprived and technologically less
sophisticated administrative agencies.
Conscripted enforcement marks one of the federal government’s boldest
encroachments into the firm by shaping its contracts, relationships, structure,
and governance. Moreover, as a descriptive matter, the world’s largest firms
now have affirmative duties to act for the public benefit. Policymakers may have
thereby strengthened the case of those calling on firms to do more for society, at
least in the sense of providing a breathtaking precedent for the state enlisting
businesses into its service.
Shareholders remain the greatest beneficiary of the firm, and administrative
agencies are still the most important regulators. However, any account of either
the firm or regulation is incomplete without recognizing that the frontier of
enforcement is policed by large businesses serving as gatekeepers for some of
society’s most important laws.
***

